



# ORIENTATION PACKET



May 25, 2023

Dear EFT UC Berkeley Teacher Participant,

Enclosed please find the orientation materials for the Economics for Teachers program being held June 19-24, 2023 at the University of California, Berkeley. This packet should prepare you for the program and answer any questions you may have.

We have included the following items:

- Program Orientation Information including registration, residence hall, meeting room locations and a program overview.
- A campus map
- A tentative program schedule
- Ground transportation information
- Information regarding registering for college credit through our university partner, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

You are required to attend all teacher activities, complete the short reading assignments, and go to the accompanying meals outlined in the schedule. If there is an anticipated conflict, please let us know immediately.

Prior to the start of the program, contact FTE directly at (530) 757-4630 (Pacific Standard Time) with any questions. For a travel change or emergency ON MONDAY, JUNE 19, please call our staff person on site, Amanda Stiglbauer, at (803) 944-2326.

We look forward to your participation in EFT UC Berkeley.

Sincerely,

*Haley Sisler*

Haley H. Sisler

Director, Planning + Outreach

Foundation for Teaching Economics



# TEACHER ORIENTATION INFORMATION



**ECONOMICS FOR TEACHERS (EFT) – June 19-24, 2023**

University of California - Berkeley, CA

## Registration/Check-In

Monday, June 19, 2023 between 2:00 - 4:00 PM at the front desk of Foothill Residence Hall, located at 2700 Hearst Ave., Berkeley, CA 94720. Room keys and meal cards will be distributed during this time. FTE staff will be on site from 2:00 PM on Monday, June 19th through 5:00 PM on Saturday, June 24th.

## Parking

The closest parking to Foothill Hall is the Foothill Lot or the Upper Hearst Lot. It is ticketed parking by the hour using [paybyphone.com](http://paybyphone.com).

## Housing

Participants will stay in Foothill Residence Hall and will be housed individually in suite style single dorm rooms with a shared bath. No smoking is allowed in the residence hall.

## Meals

Participants will eat their meals together throughout the program in Foothill Dining Hall, except for Thursday night's dinner – this meal is at the participant's own expense. Any extra snacks, outside of the program meals, will be at the participant's expense.

## Meeting Room

The large meeting room for the week in the mornings will be the Assembly Room in Foothill Residence Hall. Teachers will meet in Foothill Classroom A for afternoon breakout sessions.

## Recreation Options

FTE is waiting to hear from the university whether on campus recreation facilities will be available for participant use. Updates will be provided at the program.

### Expenses

Participants are responsible for arranging their own travel plans and paying for any travel expenses to and from EFT. They are also responsible for any additional incidental (optional) expenses. Housing, all other meals, and program materials are covered by FTE. It is your responsibility to have enough cash to handle incidentals. Neither FTE staff nor UC Berkeley can cash any checks. Please do not bring a large amount of cash to the program.

### Personal Supplies

Bring items that will make your stay comfortable, including personal hygiene items and shower slippers/flip flops. All bedding, linens and towels are provided by Conference Services. All classroom supplies will be provided by FTE. Neither UC Berkeley nor FTE can assume responsibility for your personal belongings – Laptop computers are not required and bringing them is at the discretion of the participant.

### Dress Code

Classroom-appropriate, casual, comfortable, easy-care clothing is the rule on campus. Shorts, T-shirts, and jeans are acceptable. Shoes, sandals, or flip flops must be worn to the classroom and dining hall. You may wish to pack a light sweater or pullover for the classroom sessions, since the air conditioning can be chilly.

### Emergency Phone Numbers

Campus Safety: Police: 911 or 510.642.6760

### Program Overview

The Economics for Teachers and Economics for Leaders programs represents a unique experience in economics education that brings together two groups: rising high school juniors and seniors selected for their leadership potential who want to study economics, and high school economics teachers who wish to enhance their teaching skills in the subject. The EFT one-week program encompasses 30 hours of instruction plus small group sessions and workshops. The combination of classroom instruction, question and answer sessions, small group discussion, and workshops presents information in a rich and varied format, encouraging active student and teacher participation. Economics professors selected nationwide for their expertise and teaching effectiveness lead classes using case studies to illustrate economics principles and leadership concepts.

EFT is designed to create a diverse learning environment for the students while teachers can observe, in action, the types of teaching methods advocated by FTE. In addition to study sessions, the program also includes leadership components which emphasize self-exploration through teamwork exercises. These activities provide a physical outlet and an enjoyable diversion from the economics lessons.

### Teacher Goals:

1. Improve classroom effectiveness in the teaching of economics.

2. Exploration of an economic way of thinking, with numerous classroom applications.
3. Introduction to effective instructional materials and methods for use in the secondary school classroom.
4. Foster an environment for teachers to share ideas with their peers.

#### Pre-Program Assignment

To prepare for the Monday night discussion that will follow the opening activities and dinner, please read chapters 1 and 4 of *The Economics of Public Issues* (20th edition) before arriving at the program. FTE is providing participants with a copy of this book at the program, but the pre-program assignment is included in the following pages of this orientation packet.

#### UCCS Graduate Credit

Registration is optional and is completed directly through UCCS online. Directions on how to enroll in this credit are included in this packet.

#### Schedule

A final schedule will be distributed at program registration on Monday. The start and finish times of the program will not change whatsoever.

#### Questions

Prior to the start of the program, contact the FTE directly at (530)757-4630 with any questions. For a travel change or emergency on MONDAY, JUNE 19 only, you can call the on-site Mentor Teacher, Amanda Stiglbauer, at (803) 944-2326.


**ECONOMICS FOR TEACHERS - University of California - Berkeley, CA**  
**June 19-24, 2023**

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
	<b>BREAKFAST 7:30 - 8:30 am</b>				
	<b>Foothill Assembly Room</b>				
	<b>8:30 - 9:40 am</b> Econ Topic #1 <i>Ec. Growth &amp; Scarcity</i>	<b>8:30 - 9:20 am</b> Econ Activity #2 <i>In the Chips</i>	<b>8:30 - 9:30 am</b> Econ Topic #5 <i>Labor Markets</i>	<b>8:30 - 8:45 am</b> Econ Activity #4 <i>The Fish Activity</i>	<b>8:30 - 9:10 am</b> Econ Topic #9 <i>Money &amp; Inflation</i>
	<b>9:50 - 10:30 am</b> Econ Activity #1 <i>Magic of Markets</i>	<b>9:30 - 10:30 am</b> Econ Topic #3 <i>Open Markets</i>	<b>9:40 - 10:40 am</b> Econ Activity #3 <i>Job Jungle</i>	<b>8:45 - 10:00 am</b> Econ Topic #7 <i>Property Rights</i>	<b>9:20 - 10:10 am</b> Econ Activity #6 <i>Tic-Tac-Toe Tariff</i>
	<b>10:40 - 11:50 am</b> Econ Topic #2 <i>Opportunity Cost</i>	<b>10:40 - 11:50 am</b> Econ Topic #4 <i>Markets in Action</i>	<b>10:50 - 11:50 am</b> Econ Topic #6 <i>Incentives, Innovations &amp; the Role of Institutions</i>	<b>10:10 - 10:40 am</b> Econ Activity #5 <i>Farmers &amp; Fishers</i>	<b>10:20 - 11:00 am</b> Econ Topic #10 <i>Internat'l Markets</i>
				<b>10:50 - 11:50 am</b> Econ Session #8 <i>Government</i>	<b>11:00-11:50</b> Teacher/Student Close & Post-test
	<b>LUNCH 12:00 - 1:00 pm</b>				
	<b>Foothill Classroom A</b>				
	<b>1:00 - 1:10</b> Activity 1# Debrief	<b>1:00 - 1:10</b> Activity #2 Debrief	<b>1:00 - 1:10</b> Activity #3 Debrief	<b>1:00 - 1:10</b> Act. #4&5 Debrief	<b>12:45 - 1:00</b> Group Photo
<b>Check-In Location:</b> <b>Foothill Residence Hall</b>	<b>1:10 - 1:45 pm</b> Econ Topics 1 & 2 For Teachers	<b>1:10 - 1:40 pm</b> Econ Topics 3&4 For Teachers	<b>1:10 - 1:40 pm</b> Econ Topics 5&6 For Teachers	<b>1:10 - 1:40 pm</b> Econ Topics 7&8 For Teachers	<b>1:00 - 1:10</b> Activity #6 Debrief
<b>2:00-4:00pm</b> Registration	<b>2:00 - 3:00 pm</b> Readings Discussion	<b>1:50 - 2:40 pm</b> Econ Activity #8 <i>Market for Thingamajigs</i>	<b>1:50 - 2:40 pm</b> Econ Activity #9 <i>Cartels &amp; Competition</i>	<b>1:50 - 2:40 pm</b> Econ Activity #10 <i>Foreign Currency</i>	<b>1:10 - 1:40 pm</b> Econ Topics 9&10 For Teachers
<b>Foothill Lobby</b>	<b>3:10 - 4:00</b> Econ Topic A <i>Poverty &amp; Ecn Grwth</i>	<b>2:50 - 3:20 pm</b> Econ Topic B <i>Supply, Demand, MC &amp; MB</i>	<b>2:50 - 3:20 pm</b> Econ Topic C <i>Productivity &amp; Economic Growth</i>	<b>2:50 - 3:20 pm</b> Econ Topic D <i>Debt, Deficit &amp; The Federal Budget</i>	<b>1:50 - 2:40 pm</b> Econ Activity #11 <i>Econ Barometer/FTE Rsrchs</i>
<b>4:00 - 6:00 pm</b> Welcome & Introduction		<b>3:20 - 4:00 pm</b> Readings Discussion	<b>3:20 - 4:00 pm</b> Readings Discussion	<b>3:20 - 4:00 pm</b> Readings Discussion	<b>2:50 - 3:20 pm</b> Econ Topic E 1) <i>Monetary Policy</i> 2) <i>Int'l Econ. Assns.</i>
<b>6:00 - 7:30 pm</b> Dinner					<b>3:20 - 4:00 pm</b> Readings Discussion
<b>Foothill Classroom A</b>		<b>Recreation Time 4:00 - 5:30 pm</b>			<b>4:00 - 5:00 pm</b> Closing & Program Eval.
<b>7:30 - 9:00 pm</b> Program Preparation <i>Hypothesis for the Week &amp; Readings Discussion</i>		<b>Dinner 5:30 - 6:30 pm</b>			
<b>9:00 ---</b> Free Time	<b>6:30 ---</b> Free Time	<b>6:30 ---</b> Free Time	<b>6:30 ---</b> Free Time	<b>6:30 ---</b> Free Time	<b>5:00 pm ---</b> Check Out

# UC BERKELEY CAMPUS MAP KEY

Alumni House, D-5  
Andersen Auditorium (Haas School of Business), C-2  
Anthony Hall, C/D-4  
Anthropology and Art Practice building, D-3  
Architects and Engineers (A&E), D-4  
Bancroft Library, C-4  
Banway Bldg., D-7  
Barker Hall, A/B-6  
Barrow Lane, D-4  
BART Station, C-7  
Bechtel Engineering Center, B-3/4  
Berkeley Art Museum, C-6/7  
Berkeley Way West, A/B-7  
Birge Hall, C-3  
Blum Hall, A/B-4  
Botanical Garden, C-1  
Brain Imaging Center, B-5  
Bauer Wurster Hall, D-2/3  
C.V. Starr East Asian Library, B-4  
California Hall, C-4  
California Memorial Stadium, C/D-1/2  
Calvin Laboratory, D-2  
Campanile (Sather Tower), C-3  
Campbell Hall, B/C-3  
Career Center, D/E-5  
Chan Shun Auditorium  
(Valley Life Sciences Bldg.), C-5  
Chávez Student Center, D-4/5  
Cheit Hall, C-2  
Chou Hall, C-2  
Clark Kerr Campus, F-1  
Class of 1914 Fountain, D-3  
Class of '54 Gate, A/B-4  
Cory Hall, A/B-3  
Cyclotron Rd., B-2  
Davis Hall, B-3/4  
Doe Memorial Library, C-4  
Donner Lab, B-3  
Durant Hall, C-4  
Durham Studio Theatre (Dwinelle Hall), C-5  
Dwinelle Annex, C/D-5  
Dwinelle Hall, C-4/5  
East Gate, B-3  
Edwards Stadium, D-6  
Eshleman Hall, D-4/5  
Etcheverry Hall, A-4  
Evans Hall, B-3  
Eye Center (Minor Hall Addition), C/D-3  
Eye Center (Tang Center), D/E-6  
Faculty Club, C-3  
Faculty Glade, C-3  
Founders' Rock, A/B-3  
Fox Cottage, E-3/4  
Frank Schlessinger Way, C-6  
Gayley Rd., B/C-2  
Genetics and Plant Biology Bldg., B-6  
Giannini Hall, B-5  
Giauque Hall, C-3  
Gilman Hall, C-3  
Golden Bear Recreation Center, F-2  
Goldman Field, D-6  
Goldman Plaza, D-1/2  
Goldman School of Public Policy, A-3  
Greenhouse, A-7  
Grinnell Natural Area, C-6  
Haas Pavilion, D-5  
Haas School of Business, C-2  
Hargrove Music Library, D-3  
Haste Street Child Development Center, F-5  
Haviland Hall, B-4/5  
Hazardous Materials Facility, C-6  
Hearst Field Annex, D-4  
Hearst Greek Theatre, B-2  
Hearst Memorial Gymnasium, D-3/4  
Hearst Memorial Mining Bldg., B-3  
Hearst Mining Circle, B-3  
Hearst Museum of Anthropology, D-3  
Heating Plant, Central, C-6  
Hellman Tennis Complex, C-6  
Hertz Hall, C/D-3  
Hesse Hall, B-4  
Hewlett-Packard Auditorium (Soda Hall), A-3/4  
Hildebrand Hall, C-3  
Hilgard Hall, B-5  
Innovative Genomics Institute Building A/B-6/7  
Insectary, A-7  
International House, D-2  
Ishi Court, C-5  
Jacobs Hall, A-4  
Jones Child Study Center, E-6  
Kleeberger Field House, D-6  
Koshland Hall, A/B-6  
Krutch Theater, F-2  
Latimer Hall, B/C-3  
Law Building, D-2  
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, A/B-1/2  
Lawrence Hall of Science, C-1  
Legends Aquatic Center, D/E-6  
Levine-Fricke Field, C-1  
Lewis Hall, B/C-3  
Lower Sproul Plaza, D-4/5  
Martin Luther King Jr. Student Union, D-4  
Mathematical Sciences Research Institute, C-1  
Maxwell Family Field, C-2  
McCone Hall, B-4  
McLaughlin Hall, B-4  
Memorial Glade and Pool, B-4  
Memorial Stadium, C/D-1/2  
Minor Hall, C-2/3  
Minor Hall Addition, C-3  
Moffitt Undergraduate Library, B/C-4/5  
Morgan Hall, B-6  
Morrison Hall, C/D-3  
Moses Hall, C-4  
Mulford Hall, B-6  
Natural Resources Laboratory, A-6  
North Field, D-3  
North Gate Hall, A-4  
Northwest Animal Facility, A/B-6  
O'Brien Hall, B-4  
Observatory Hill, B-4  
Old Art Gallery, C/D-4  
Optometry Clinic (Eye Center,  
Minor Hall Addition), C-3  
Optometry Clinic (Eye Center, Tang Center), D/E-6  
Parking Lots/Structures, A-3, A-4/5, A-6, C-7,  
D-3, D-5, D-7, E-4, E/F-3, E/F-5/6  
Physics North, C-3  
Physics South, C-3  
Pimentel Hall, B-3  
Pitzer Auditorium (Latimer Hall), C-2/3  
Police, UC (Sproul Hall), D-4  
Recreational Sports Facility, D-5/6  
Residence Halls  
Blackwell Hall, D/E-5  
Bowles Hall, B/C-2  
Clark Kerr Campus, F-1  
Cleary Hall, E/F-4/5  
Foothill Residence Halls, A/B-2/3  
Ida Louise Jackson Graduate House, E-2/3  
Martinez Commons E/F-4  
Stern Hall, B-2/3  
Unit 1, E-3  
Unit 2, F-3  
Unit 3, E-5  
Residential and Student Services Bldg., E-3  
Sather Gate, D-4  
Sather Rd., C-4  
Sather Tower (Campanile), C-3/4  
Senior Hall, C-3  
Sibley Auditorium (Bechtel Engineering  
Center), B-3/4  
Silver Space Sciences Laboratory, C-1  
Simon Hall, D-2  
Simpson Center, C/D-1/2  
Social Sciences Building, D-4  
Soda Hall, A-3/4  
South Hall, C-4  
Spieker Aquatics Complex, D-5  
Spieker Plaza, D-5  
Springer Gateway, C-6  
Sproul Hall, D-4  
Sproul Plaza, D-4  
Stadium Rim Way, C-1/2  
Stanley Hall, B-3  
Stephens Hall, C-3/4  
Strawberry Canyon Recreation Area, C-1  
Stu Gordon Stadium, D-6  
Sutardja Dai Hall, A/B-3/4  
Tan Hall, B/C-3  
Tang Center, E-6  
UC Berkeley Extension, B-7  
Underhill Playing Field, E-3  
University Hall, B/C-6  
University Health Services, D/E-6  
University House, A/B-5  
Valley Life Sciences Bldg., C-5  
Visitor Center (Memorial Stadium), D-2  
Warren Hall, A-6/7  
Weill Hall, C-5  
Wellman Hall, B-5  
West Circle, B/C-5/6  
West Gate, C-6  
Wheeler Hall, C-4  
Wickson Natural Area, B-5  
Witter Field, C-1  
Women's Faculty Club, C-2/3  
Woo Hon Fai Hall, D/E-3  
Zellerbach Hall, D-5  
Zellerbach Playhouse, D-5





# 2023 GROUND TRANSPORTATION

ECONOMICS FOR TEACHERS  
University of California, Berkeley  
Foothill Residence Hall  
2700 Hearst Ave., Berkeley, CA 94720

Conference participants are responsible for arranging and paying for their own transportation to and from the program. The campus is approximately 30 minutes from the Oakland International Airport (OAK) and 50 minutes from the San Francisco International Airport (SFO).

A variety of other ground transportation options are available from the airport to UCB, including taxis, buses, and shuttles. For more information on ground transportation you can visit the airport websites listed below.

## OAKLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (OAK)

<https://www.oaklandairport.com/ground-transportation/>

### Door to Door Shuttles

A1 American Shuttle – 510.300.7979

A number of taxi cab companies are listed on the Ground Transportation page of the OAK website (link above).

## SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (SFO)

<https://www.flysfo.com/passengers/ground-transportation>



LAS Extended Studies	
Office:	719-255-4071
Toll free:	800-990-8227 x4071
E-mail:	lases@uccs.edu
<a href="https://lases.uccs.edu/programs-a-l/fte">https://lases.uccs.edu/programs-a-l/fte</a>	

## Foundation for Teaching Economics (FTE) Graduate Credit Registration Instructions: Summer 2023

<b>Economics For Teachers (EFT)</b> <i>Credit Sections for Teachers Only</i>	<b>Course number:</b> <b>ECON 6330-701</b>	<b>3 credit hrs</b>	<b>Tuition:</b> <b>\$360</b>	<b>5-Digit Class#:</b> <b>21178</b>
<b>Credit Registration Deadline: July 31, 2023</b>				

### IMPORTANT NOTES:

- ✓ Please use this packet to enroll for credit if you are attending any of the following EFT courses:
  - **VIRTUAL:** EFT-Virtual (June 18-23); EFT-Virtual (July 2-7).
  - **IN-PERSON:** UC Berkeley-Berkeley, CA (June 19-24); Boston College-Boston, MA (July 10-15); University of Washington-Seattle, WA (July 17-22); Vanderbilt University-Nashville, TN (July 24-29).
- ✓ If you wish to enroll after the published registration deadline, you must contact LAS Extended Studies at [lases@uccs.edu](mailto:lases@uccs.edu) to request an Extended Studies late add form. You will be charged a \$25 late registration fee by the University to register late – no exceptions. The best way to avoid this is to register early! Last day to register late for the Summer 2023 semester is August 4, 2023, which is the last day the UCCS Summer 2023 application will be available.
- ✓ Approximately six weeks after the conclusion of the course, you may request your official UCCS transcript: please see <https://registrar.uccs.edu/transcripts>



### Have you enrolled in a graduate-level course at UCCS in the past 3 semesters?

- If yes, you already have an active myUCCS Student Portal Account and can skip to STEP 3.
- **If you have not been active for the past 3 semesters, you must re-apply to UCCS per the instructions below and your account will re-activate.**
- Forgot your myUCCS Student Portal username/password? Proceed to: <https://accounts.uccs.edu> or call 719-255-4357

### STEP 1 --Apply: Academic Outreach/Extended Studies

Access the "UCCS Academic Outreach Application":

- Go to <https://outreach.uccs.edu/apply>

Completing the Application:

- Provide your personal information; select "Save & Next"
- From the drop down menus:
  - Select an Admit Term: **SUMMER 2023**
  - Select Desired Program: **Graduate Non-Degree**
- Provide answers to the education and eligibility questions; select "Save & Next"
- Verify that the information you provided is correct, select "Submit"

(go to next page)

## STEP 2 ---Claim Your Account

Within 24 hours of submitting your application, you will receive an automated e-mail when your myUCCS student portal account is ready. You can then proceed to <https://accounts.uccs.edu> to claim your account to access your student portal --- where you can register, pay your bill, request transcripts, and the like.



- **Keep this username and password for future access into your myUCCS Student Portal**
- Please note: our automated e-mails may go to "junk mail," depending upon your e-mail filter set-up.

## STEP 3 ---Register and Pay

Log In to your myUCCS student portal: [www.uccs.edu/portal](http://www.uccs.edu/portal)

### Registration:

- Select **"Register for Classes"** from the Quick Links box; or, select **"Records and Registration"** from the menu at the top right, then select **"Register for Classes"**
  - ✓ Pre-registration verifications: address (*'Home' address marked as 'Local'*), phone numbers, emergency contact
  - ✓ Tuition and Fee Agreement and Disclosure
- **Enter the 5-Digit Class Number "21178"** under "Search by Class Number". Click **"Submit Class Number"**
- Confirm the details of the course and click **"Next"**
- **Check the box** of the course you would like to enroll, under the **"Select"** column in the shopping cart
- Click **"add selected classes"**
- Confirm the course and click **"Finish Enrolling"**

### Payment:

- Select **"View/Pay My Bill"** from the Quick Links box; or, select **"Student Financials (Bursars)"** from the menu at the top right, then select **"View/Pay My Bill"**
- Enter the **payment amount** and **payment method** and click on **"Continue"**
- Provide **payment information** for the selected method and click **"Continue"**
- Confirm the payment information and click **"Confirm"** ---*Print a copy for your records, if needed*

# Economics for Teachers – Reading Assignments

## *The Economics of Public Issues*

20<sup>th</sup> ed., by Roger L. Miller, Daniel K. Benjamin, and Douglas C. North.  
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2018)

Please read the assigned chapter(s) before the afternoon session in preparation for small and large group discussions and text analysis.

### **Pre-program Reading Assignment – For Sunday Evening & Monday Afternoon Sessions**

- Chapter 1: Death by Bureaucrat
- Chapter 4: The Mystery of Wealth

### **Monday Night – for Tuesday afternoon session**

- Chapter 3: Flying the Friendly Skies?
- Chapter 9: Are We Running Out of Water?
- Chapter 28: The Death of Recycling

### **Tuesday Night – for Wednesday afternoon session**

- Chapter 8: Kidneys for Sale
- Chapter 16: Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies
- Chapter 18: Keeping the Competition Out

### **Wednesday Night – for Thursday afternoon session**

- Chapter 11: Das Kapital in the Twenty-First Century
- Chapter 13: The Effects of the Minimum Wage
- Chapter 23: The Graying of America

### **Thursday Night – for Friday afternoon session**

- Chapter 5: The Economics of Exclusion
- Chapter 22: Student Loans
- Chapter 26: Save That Species

### **Friday Night – for Saturday**

- Chapter 30: Globalization and the Wealth of America
- Chapter 31: The \$750,000 Steelworker

## CHAPTER 1

# Death by Bureaucrat

How would you rather die? From a lethal reaction to a drug prescribed by your doctor? Or because your doctor failed to prescribe a drug that could have saved your life? If this choice sounds like one you would rather not make, consider this: Employees of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) make that decision on behalf of millions of Americans many times each year. More precisely, FDA bureaucrats decide whether or not new medicines (prescription drugs) should be allowed to go on sale in the United States. If the FDA rules against a drug, physicians in America may not legally prescribe it, even if the drug is saving thousands of lives each year in other countries.

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FDA

The FDA's authority to make such decisions dates back to the passage of the Food and Drug Safety Act of 1906. This law required that medicines be correctly labeled as to their contents and that they not contain any substances harmful to consumers' health. Due to this legislation, Dr. Hostatter's Stomach Bitters and Kickapoo Indian Sagwa—along with numerous rum-laden concoctions, cocaine-based potions, and supposed anticancer remedies—disappeared from druggists' shelves. In 1938, the law was expanded with the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which forced manufacturers to demonstrate the safety of new drugs before being allowed to offer them for sale. (This law was prompted by the deaths of 107 people who had taken Elixir Sulfanilamide, an antibiotic that had been errantly mixed with poisonous diethylene glycol, a chemical cousin of antifreeze.)

The next step in U.S. drug regulation came after a spate of severe birth defects among infants whose mothers during pregnancy had taken a sleep aid known as thalidomide. By the time these birth defects first became apparent, the drug was already widely used in Europe and Canada, and the FDA was nearing approval for its use in the United States. In fact, about 2.5 million thalidomide tablets were already in the hands of U.S. physicians as samples, though none had been distributed. The FDA ordered the samples destroyed and prohibited the drug's sale in the United States. This incident led to the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the 1938 Act, radically altering the drug-approval process in the United States.

### THE IMPACT OF THE 1962 AMENDMENTS

Before the 1962 amendments, the FDA was expected to approve a new drug application within 180 days, unless the application failed to show that the drug was safe. The 1962 amendments added a "proof of efficacy" requirement and also removed the time constraint on the FDA. The FDA was given free rein to determine how much and what type of evidence it would demand before approving a drug for sale, and thus could take as long as it wanted before either granting or refusing approval.

The 1962 amendments drastically increased the costs of introducing a new drug and markedly slowed the approval process. Before 1962, for example, the average time between the filing and approval of a new drug application was seven months. By 1967, it was thirty months, and by the late 1970s, it had risen to eight to ten years. The protracted approval process involved costly testing by the drug companies—now more than \$2.5 billion for each new drug—and delayed the receipt of any potential revenue from new drugs. Because the delays and the higher costs reduced the expected profitability of new drugs, fewer of them were brought onto the market.

Debate continues over how much FDA regulation is needed to ensure that drugs are both safe and efficacious, but there is little doubt that the 1962 amendments resulted in a U.S. "drug lag." In short order, drugs took far longer to reach the market in the United States than they did in Europe, a lag that grew and then persisted for more than three decades. Admittedly, it takes time to ensure that patients benefit from, rather than are harmed by, new drugs, but regulation-induced drug lag can itself be life threatening. Dr. George Hitchings, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Medicine, estimated that the five-year lag in introducing Septra (an antibiotic) to the United States killed 80,000 people. Similarly, the introduction of a class of drugs called beta blockers—a drug used to treat

heart attack victims and people with high blood pressure—was delayed nearly a decade in America relative to its approval in Europe. According to several researchers, the lag in the FDA approval of these beta-blocker drugs cost the lives of at least 250,000 Americans.

### TERRIBLE TRADE-OFF

In effect, the law requires FDA bureaucrats to make what is truly a terrible trade-off. On the one hand, lives can be saved because unsafe or ineffective drugs are kept off the market. On the other hand, the regulatory process delays (or even prevents) the introduction of some safe and efficacious drugs, thereby forfeiting lives. Let us now take a more systematic look at this trade-off.

Every time a new drug is introduced, there is a chance that it should not have been—either because it has adverse side effects that outweigh the therapeutic benefits (it is not safe) or because it really does little to help the individuals who take it (it is not effective). When such a drug is introduced, we say that a **Type I error** has been committed. Since 1962, the incidence of Type I error—the thalidomide possibility—has been reduced by the added testing required by the FDA. Other people, however, have been the victims of what is called a **Type II error**. Their cost is the pain, suffering, and death that occur because the 1962 amendments have prevented or delayed the introduction of safe, efficacious drugs. A Type II error—as with Septra or beta blockers—occurs when a drug *should* be introduced but is held back by FDA regulation.

Eventually, outcries over the harm caused by the drug lag brought about important policy changes. For example, the FDA moved to accelerate approvals when the costs of Type I errors are small relative to the damages due to Type II errors—as with terminally ill patients. One famous example involved azidothymidine (AZT), which emerged as a possible treatment for AIDS. Gay men, among whom AIDS was most prevalent at the time, took the lead in pressuring the FDA to approve the drug quickly. As a result, the agency approved AZT after only eighteen months of testing. Similarly, Taxol, an important drug used to treat breast cancer, received an expedited review by the FDA because of pressure applied by women who had a family history of breast cancer.

### THE USER FEE REVOLUTION

The most important change to U.S. drug regulation came in 1992, with the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts. These laws mandated FDA performance goals in reviewing and acting on drug applications

within set time periods, in return for charging fees on drug manufacturers' submissions. The FDA has used these fees to expand its drug review staff and facilities, and the fees now comprise more than half of the agency's drug review budget.

The results have been stunning. Approval times for new drugs have been cut to ten months and the drug lag has been reversed. In the 1980s, less than 10 percent of new drugs were introduced first in the United States before anywhere else in the world. Today, more than two-thirds of new drugs are approved in the United States first. Indeed, for the last decade, the FDA has approved drugs more quickly than any other regulator in the world.

The acceleration in the drug review process has stimulated a major increase in pharmaceutical research and development, along with a consequent increase in pharmaceutical innovation. There has been an outpouring of new drugs, most notably for the treatment of cancer and the prevention and treatment of heart disease, but also extending across the board to many other diseases. Despite having to pay for FDA review, pharmaceutical firms have earned higher profits. Most importantly, the lives of many thousands of people have been saved or extended. In addition, because drug approval elsewhere is likely to come sooner once the FDA has approved a drug, people in other nations have benefitted, too.

### LESSONS FROM THE FDA STORY

What can we learn from the FDA regulation of new drugs that will guide us in thinking about other public issues of our time? There are several key principles:

1. *There is no free lunch.* Every choice, and thus every policy, entails a **cost**—something must be given up. In a world of **scarcity**, we cannot have more of everything; so to get more of some things, we must give up other things. Although the FDA review of drugs saves lives by preventing the introduction of unsafe or ineffective drugs, the cost is delayed availability of safe and efficacious drugs, resulting in the deaths of other people.
2. *The cost of an action is the alternative that is sacrificed.* Economists often express costs (and benefits) in dollars because this is a simple means of accounting for and measuring them. But costs need not be monetary, and economics is capable of analyzing costs and benefits that are quite human. The costs that led to the 1938 and 1962 amendments were the very visible deaths caused by sulfanilamide and the terrible birth defects due to thalidomide. Subsequent

revisions to the FDA process for reviewing drugs, as with the user fee acts, have been in response to the deaths and other adverse health effects caused by the regulation-induced drug lag.

3. *The relevant costs and benefits are the marginal (incremental) ones.* The relevant question is not whether safety is good or bad; rather, it is *how much* safety we want—which can only be answered by looking at the added (marginal) benefits of more safety compared to the added (marginal) costs, a topic fully explored in Chapter 3. One possible response to the sulfanilamide poisonings or thalidomide birth defects was to have outlawed new drugs altogether. Such a response would have guaranteed that no harm would ever occur to anyone because of a new drug. But surely this “solution” would not be sensible, because the marginal cost (more Type II errors) would exceed the marginal benefit (fewer Type I errors).
  4. *People respond to incentives.* This is true for consumers, suppliers, and even government bureaucrats. Here, the incentive to amend the law in 1938 and 1962 was the very visible death and disfigurement of individuals. The passage of the 1992 user fee acts resulted from intense lobbying by individuals and firms who believed (correctly, as it turned out) that many thousands of people could benefit from a speedier drug review process.
  5. *Things are not always as they seem.* Many analyses of the effects of government policies fail to account for the actions that people would otherwise have taken. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, for example, have strong incentives to avoid introducing drugs that are unsafe or ineffective because the companies are subject to loss of reputation and to lawsuits. For similar reasons, physicians have strong incentives to avoid prescribing such drugs for their patients. Even without FDA regulation, there would thus be extensive testing of new drugs before their introduction. Hence, it is incorrect to ascribe the generally safe and effective nature of modern drugs entirely to FDA protection. The flip side, however, is that the drug development process is inherently long, complicated, and costly. Even without FDA oversight, some people would die waiting for new drugs because self-interested manufacturers would insist on some testing and cautious physicians would proceed slowly in prescribing new drugs.
- FDA employees are publicly castigated when they “allow” a Type I error to occur—especially when it is a drug that kills people. Thus, FDA bureaucrats have a strong incentive to avoid such errors.

But when testing delays cause a Type II error, as with Septra, it is almost impossible to point to specific people who died because the drug was delayed. Hence, officials at the FDA are rarely attacked directly for such delays. Because the costs of Type II errors are much more difficult to discern than the costs of Type I errors, there is an inherent bias at the FDA in favor of being “safe rather than sorry”—in other words, excessive testing.

6. *Policies always have unintended consequences, so their net benefits are almost always less than anticipated.* In the case of government regulations, balancing incremental costs and benefits (see Principle 3) fails to make good headlines. Instead, what gets politicians reelected and regulators promoted are *absolute* notions such as safety (and motherhood and apple pie). Thus, if a little safety is good, more must be better, so why not simply mandate that drug testing “guarantee” that everyone is free of risk from dangerous drugs? Eventually, the reality of Principle 3 sinks in, but in this instance, not before the drug lag has killed many people.

As is often true with important public issues, our story has one more interesting twist. Thalidomide is back on the market. In 1998, the FDA approved its use in treating Hansen’s disease (leprosy), and in 2006, the FDA gave physicians the OK to use it in treating bone marrow cancer. In each instance, there are strong protections to prevent pregnant women from taking the drug. So ironically, perhaps the very drug that brought us the deadly drug lag will turn out to be a lifesaver for a new generation of patients.

### DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Why don’t individuals simply force the FDA to do what is best for consumers of prescription drugs?
2. Why don’t FDA employees accurately balance the marginal benefits to drug consumers against the marginal costs to those consumers?
3. Does the structure of the drug industry have any bearing on the types of errors that drug firms are likely to make? That is, would a drug industry made up of numerous highly competitive firms be more or less likely to introduce unsafe drugs than an industry consisting of a few large firms?
4. How could the incentives provided to the FDA be changed to reduce the incidence of Type II errors? (*Hint:* Is it possible to compare

the FDA approval process with the drug-approval process in other nations?)

5. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a regulatory system in which, rather than having the FDA permit or prohibit new drugs, the FDA merely published its opinions about the safety and efficacy of drugs and then allowed physicians to make their own decisions about whether or not to prescribe the drugs for their patients?
6. Suppose for simplicity that both Type I and Type II errors resulted in deaths only. Keeping in mind that too little caution produces Type I errors and too much caution produces Type II errors, what would be the best mix of Type I and Type II errors?

## DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Is it possible to be too safe? Explain what you mean by “too safe.”
2. Suppose it is possible to observe (or measure) four attributes of airlines: (i) the size of their planes (measured in passenger-carrying capacity), (ii) the experience levels of their pilots, (iii) the age of their planes, and (iv) the length of the typical route they fly. Which airlines would be likely to have the fewest fatal accidents? Which would be expected to have the most?
3. Is safety likely to be a “normal” good (i.e., something people want to consume more of as they get richer)? Use your answer to this question to predict likely safety records of airlines based in North America and Europe, compared to those based in South America and Africa. Then go to [www.airsafe.com](http://www.airsafe.com) to see if your prediction is confirmed or refuted by the facts.
4. Many automobile manufacturers routinely advertise the safety of their cars, yet airlines generally do not mention safety in their advertising. Can you suggest an explanation for this difference?
5. Many economists would argue that private companies are likely to be more efficient than the government at operating airlines. Yet many economists would also argue that there is a valid reason for the government to regulate the safety of those same airlines. Can you explain why the government might be good at ensuring safety, even though it might not be good at operating the airlines?
6. Professional football teams sometimes charter airplanes to take them to their away games. Would you feel safer on a United Airlines plane that had been chartered by the Washington Redskins than on a regularly scheduled United Airlines flight?

## CHAPTER 4

## The Mystery of Wealth

Why are the citizens of some nations rich while the inhabitants of others are poor? Your initial answer might be, “because of differences in the **natural resource endowments** of the nations.” It is true that ample endowments of energy, timber, and fertile land all help raise wealth. But natural resources can be only a very small part of the answer, as witnessed by many counterexamples. Switzerland and Luxembourg, for example, are nearly devoid of key natural resources, yet the real incomes of citizens of those countries are among the world’s highest. Similarly, Hong Kong, which consists of a few square miles of rock and hillside, is one of the economic miracles of modern times, while in Russia, a land amply endowed with vast quantities of virtually every important resource, most people remain mired in economic misery.

A number of studies have begun to unravel the mystery of **economic growth**. Repeatedly, they have found that it is the fundamental political and legal **institutions** of society that are conducive to growth. Of these, political stability, secure private property rights, and legal systems based on the **rule of law** are among the most important. Such institutions encourage people to make long-term investments in improving land and in all forms of **physical capital** and **human capital**. These investments raise the **capital stock**, which in turn provides for more growth long into the future. Also, the cumulative effects of this growth over time eventually yield much higher standards of living.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

Consider first the contrasting effects of different legal systems on economic growth. Many legal systems around the world today are based on



**Table 4-1** Differing Legal Systems

<i>Common Law Nations</i>	<i>Civil Law Nations</i>
Australia	Brazil
Canada	Egypt
India	France
Israel	Greece
New Zealand	Italy
United Kingdom	Mexico
United States	Sweden

one of two models: the English **common law system** and the French **civil law system**. Common law systems reflect a conscious decision in favor of a limited role for government and emphasize the importance of the judiciary in constraining the power of the executive and legislative branches of government. In contrast, civil law systems favor the creation of a strong centralized government in which the legislature and the executive branches have the power to grant preferential treatment to special interests. Table 4-1 shows a sampling of common law and civil law countries.

Research reveals that the security of **property rights** is much stronger in common law systems, such as those observed in Britain and its former colonies, including the United States. In nations such as France and its former colonies, the civil law systems are much more likely to yield unpredictable changes in the rules of the game—the structure of **property and contract rights**. This unpredictability makes people reluctant to make long-term fixed investments, which ultimately slows the economic growth of these nations and lowers the standard of living for their citizens.

The reasoning is simple. If you know that the police will not help you protect your rights to a home or a car, you are less likely to acquire those assets. Similarly, if you cannot easily enforce business or employment contracts that you make, you are less likely to make those contracts—and hence less likely to produce as many goods or services. If you cannot plan for the future because you don't know what the rules of the game will be in ten years or perhaps even one year from now, you are less likely to make the productive long-term investments that take years to pay off. And if you cannot be assured of the rewards from developing successful new goods and services, innovation will be stifled (see Chapter 2). Common law systems seem to do a better job at enforcing contracts and securing property rights and so would be expected to promote economic activity now and economic growth over time.

## THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS

Research into the economic performance of nations around the world from 1960 to the 1990s found that economic growth was one-third higher in the common law nations, with their strong property rights, than in civil law nations. Over the more than three decades covered, the standard of living—measured by real **per capita income**—increased more than 20 percent in common law nations compared to civil law nations. If such a pattern persisted over the span of a century, it would produce a staggering 80 percent real per capita income difference in favor of nations with secure property rights.

Other research has taken a much broader view, both across time and across institutions, in assessing economic growth. Institutions, such as political stability, protection against violence or theft, security of contracts, and freedom from regulatory burdens, all contribute to sustained economic growth. Indeed, it is key institutions such as these, rather than natural resource endowments, that explain long-term differences in economic growth and thus present-day differences in levels of real income. To illustrate the powerful effect of institutions, consider the contrast between Mexico, with per capita real income of about \$18,000 today, and the United States, with per capita real income of about \$56,000. Had Mexico developed with the same political and legal institutions that the United States has enjoyed, per capita income in Mexico would today be equal to that in the United States.

## THE ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONS

Given the great importance of such institutions in determining long-term growth, one might ask another important question: How have countries acquired the political and legal institutions they have today? The answer has to do with disease, of all things. An examination of more than seventy former European colonies reveals that a variety of strategies were pursued. In Australia, New Zealand, and North America, the colonists found geography and climates that were conducive to good health. Permanent settlement was attractive, so colonists created institutions to protect private property and curb the power of the state. When Europeans arrived in Africa and South America, however, they encountered tropical diseases, such as malaria and yellow fever, that produced high mortality rates. This discouraged permanent settlement and encouraged a mentality focused on extracting metals, cash crops, and other resources. As a result, there were few **incentives** to promote democratic institutions or stable long-term property rights systems.

The differing initial institutions helped shape economic growth over the years and, because of the broad persistence of those institutions, continue to shape the political and legal character and the standard of living in these nations today.

### INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE TODAY

Recent events also illustrate that the effects of political and legal institutions can be drastically accelerated—in either direction. Consider China, which in 1979 began to change its institutions in two key ways. First, China began to experiment with private property rights for a few of its citizens, under narrow circumstances. Second, the Chinese government began to clear away obstacles to foreign investment, making China a more secure place for Western companies to do business. Although the institutional changes have been modest, their combined effects have been substantial. Over the years since, economic growth in China has accelerated, averaging almost 7 percent per year. If that doesn't sound like much, keep in mind that it has been enough over that period to raise real per capita income in China by a factor of 10.

For an example of the potential *destructive* impact of institutional change, we need to look no further than Zimbabwe. When that country won its independence from Britain in 1980, it was one of the most prosperous nations in Africa. Soon after taking power as Zimbabwe's first (and so far only) president, Robert Mugabe began disassembling that nation's rule of law, tearing apart the institutions that had helped it grow rich. He reduced the security of property rights in land and eventually confiscated those rights altogether. The Mugabe government also gradually took control of the prices of most goods and services in the nation, and confiscated large stocks of food and much of anything of value that might be exported out of or imported into Zimbabwe. In short, anything that is produced or saved became subject to confiscation, so the incentives to do either are—to put it mildly—reduced.

As a result, between 1980 and 1996, real per capita income in Zimbabwe fell by one-third, and since 1996, it has fallen by an additional third. Eighty percent of the workforce is unemployed, investment is nonexistent, and the annual inflation rate reached an astonishing 231 million percent (in 2009, Zimbabwe gave up on having its own currency, and began using several foreign currencies as **legal tender**, including the American dollar). The fruit of decades of labor and capital investment has been destroyed because the institutions that made that progress possible have been eliminated. It is a lesson we ignore at our peril.

### DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Go to a source, such as the CIA *World Factbook* or the World Bank, and collect per capita income and population data for each of the nations listed in Table 4–1. Compare the average per capita income of the common law countries with the average per capita income of the civil law countries. Based on the discussion in the chapter, identify at least two other factors that you think are important to take into account when assessing whether the differences you observe are likely to be the result of the systems of the countries.
2. Most international attempts to aid people living in low-income nations have come in one of two forms: (i) gifts of consumer goods (such as food) and (ii) assistance in constructing or obtaining capital goods (such as tractors, dams, or roads). Based on what you have learned in this chapter, how likely are such efforts to *permanently* raise the standard of living in such countries? Explain.
3. Both Louisiana and Quebec have systems of local law (state and provincial, respectively) that are heavily influenced by their common French heritage, which includes civil law. What do you predict is true about per capita income in Louisiana compared to the other U.S. states, and per capita income in Quebec compared to the other Canadian provinces? Is this prediction confirmed by the facts (which can be readily ascertained with a few quick Web searches)? Identify at least two other factors that you think are important to take into account when assessing whether the differences you observe are likely due to the influence of civil law institutions.
4. Consider two countries, A and B, that have identical *physical* endowments of a key natural resource. In country A, any profits made from extracting that resource are subject to confiscation by the government, while in country B, there is no such risk. How does the risk of expropriation affect the *economic* endowment of the two nations? In which nation are people richer?
5. In light of your answer to question 4, how do you explain that in some countries there is widespread political support for government policies that expropriate resources from some groups for the purpose of handing them out to other groups?
6. If the crucial factor determining a country's low standard of living is the adverse set of legal and cultural institutions it possesses, can you offer suggestions for how the other nations of the world might help in permanently raising that country's standard of living?